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Abstract
Early-age enlistment increases a small country’s potential army size and thereby its
attack-deterrence capacity. However, physical and psychological injuries and,
ultimately, death generate a loss of quality-adjusted life-years that reduces the net
benefit from early-age enlistment. The net benefit from early or later age recruitment
is also affected by the rise and decline of the individual’s military performance and
civilian productivity and by changes in his adjustment costs over the lifespan. The
simulations of an optimization model incorporating these elements suggest that if the
intensity of the rise and decline of the individual’s military performance is sufficiently
larger than the intensity of the rise and decline of his civilian productivity, there exists
an interior optimal enlistment age greater than the commonly practiced eighteen. In
such a case, most of the simulation results are closely scattered around twenty-one
despite large parameter changes.
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1. Introduction

Throughout the course of history countries engaged in external conflicts have
maintained conscript armies with an early enlistment age—a legacy of a long agrarian
past where life expectancy was short and boys were gradually conditioned to battle by
looking after their clan’s livestock and crops and by hunting. Early-age enlistment
increases a small country’s potential army size and thereby its deterrence capacity.
However, the possibility of physical and psychological injuries and, ultimately, death
and their associated loss of quality-adjusted life-years erode the expected benefits of
early-age enlistment. The expected benefits from earlier or later age recruitment are
also affected by the rise and decline of people’s military performance and civilian
productivity and by the changes in the costs of adjustment from civilian environment
to military environment and back to civilian environment during the lifespan.

The most common enlistment age in the technologically advanced countries
during the modern era has been eighteen. Males in these countries are likely to be
swift and powerful at eighteen years of age, but their affluent upbringing has neither
prepared them mentally to a close-range, interpersonal aggression nor to the
destruction and killing capacity of long-range modern munitions. Drawing on
interviews and first-person reports, Marshall (1978) has concluded that in World War
II only fifteen to twenty percent of combat infantry soldiers fired their rifles at
exposed enemy soldiers. According to Keegan and Holmes (1985), many of them
fired harmlessly above their enemy heads. Grossman (1996, 2000) has argued that the
exceptionally high firing rates in the Korean War (forty percent) and, in particular, the
Vietnam War (ninety percent) were due to the introduction of Pavlovian and operant
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conditioning of American combat soldiers, rather than to a widespread inclination to
kill, and led to a high rate of post-traumatic stress disorder among veterans. This
explanation might be supported by Holmes’ (1985) low assessment of the Argentine
firing rates in the Falklands War.

Drawing on these and other firing rates, on the high percentage of Vietnam
War veterans suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, and on his own combat
experience, Grossman (1996, 2000) has proposed that the majority of soldiers have
innate resistance to killing. He has argued that in combat situations the primitive,
midbrain portion takes control over soldiers’ actions and, due to species-survival
instinct, prevents them in most cases from destroying fellow human beings. This
killing-aversion proposition challenges the morality of an early enlistment-age, in
particular, for the following reasons. The first is associated with the psychological
scars borne by soldiers engaged in killing. The earlier in life they are enlisted and
participate in killing, the longer they bear these scars and the larger their loss of
quality-adjusted life years. The second reason is related to the level of representation
in decision-making. When conscription takes place at early age, most of the preservice and service men do not have direct access to political power. Politically
underrepresented, they have no strong direct influence on current recruitment laws
that render them liable to participate in killing and, thereby, adversely affect their
mental well being and hence quality of life from an early stage. This challenge can be
strengthened by a positive association between proximity to graduating from school
and intensity of the dissonance experienced by soldiers due to their current
conditioning to kill and their earlier school education to indiscriminate, humanitarian
sensitivity.
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In addition to the potential participation in killing, recruitment at early age
exposes young people to a high risk of being physically and psychologically injured
and, ultimately, killed. In each of these events the duration and the quality of their
lives and the lives of their relatives and friends are adversely affected. Though the
lower the enlistment age the larger the potential loss of years of life, aspects such as
the individual’s productivity and the number and ages of his dependents should be
considered in assessing the overall loss of quality-adjusted life-years in the case of his
death.1 Consistent with the lifecycle hypothesis (cf. Ando and Modigliani, 1963;
Modigliani, 1966) productivity and number of dependents tend to rise and then
decline over the lifespan. It is therefore possible that the greatest potential loss of
quality-adjusted life-years for a conscript and his relatives, friends and the society is
not associated with the earliest recruitment age. It is rather likely that the potential
loss of quality-adjusted life-years first rises and then declines with the enlistment age
along the feasible age range. The stronger the rise and decline of this potential loss
and the higher the probability of war and the probability of being killed in war, the
more socially desired it is to set the enlistment age closer to one of the boundaries of
the feasible enlistment-age range. When the decline of the potential loss is weaker
(stronger) than the rise, ceteris paribus, it is more socially desirable to set the
enlistment age closer to the lower-bound (upper-bound). During the last hundred
years the upper-bound of feasible enlistment-age has been increased by the rise in life
expectancy, by the changes in warfare technology2 and by the transformation in the
structure of households and in earning responsibilities. During the same period there

1

The number of quality-adjusted life-years is used in a number of health economic studies as an index
of lifetime well-being. See Bleichrodt and Quiggin (1999) for a discussion of its suitability and Levy
(2005) for an application.
2
From the perspective of soldiers, warfare has become less physically challenging.
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has been a large increase in the number of years of schooling and, thereby, a pressure
on the lower-bound of the feasible enlistment-age to rise.

In the absence of adequate, direct political representation, it took young people
years of demonstrations and civil riots to end the draft in the United States by mid
1973.3 Unlike the United States, small countries facing severe and close-to-home
geopolitical risks cannot afford civil riots. Nor can they rely on an all-volunteer army.
The earlier the enlistment age the larger their combined compulsory and reserve army
and, thereby, its war-deterrence and defensive capacity. Responsibly, most of their
young residents obey the existing recruitment rules. Nevertheless, a natural aversion
to killing and a potential large loss of quality-adjusted life-years lend support to a
revision of the enlistment age.

The construction of a non ad-hoc enlistment-age rule for a small country
maintaining a conscript defensive army is the objective of this paper. The optimal
enlistment-age is analytically derived by considering the effects of enlistment age on
army size and war-deterrence, military performance, foregone civilian output,
remunerations in the case of physical and psychological injuries and in the case of
death, and costs of adjustment. The analysis is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the relationship between the army size, deterrence capacity, probability of
war and the enlistment age. Section 3 details the expected national benefits and costs
from enlisting at a given age. Section 4 derives the optimal enlistment-age and
displays the numerical-simulation’s results for a wide range of parameter-values as
well as the effects of the model parameters on this enlistment age.

3

This process and its outcome have a generated a large literature on the economic issues and the
quantity and quality of servicepersons associated with the choice of a draft versus an all-volunteer
force. See Oi (1967) Altman and Fechter (1967), Fisher (1969) Altman and Barro (1971), Lee and
McKenzie (1992), Ross (1994) and Warner and Asch (1996, 2001).
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2. Enlistment age, army size and war deterrence and probability

One of the main arguments in favor of an early enlistment age is that it allows
a country facing geopolitical risks to enjoy a large reserve of trained soldiers.
Consider a country in which military service is compulsory due to a geopolitical sate
of hostility. The physically lower-bound on military service age is t min . The
physically upper-bound on military service age coincides with the retirement age,
t max . During a peaceful period, the army is a force of conscripts and its size is equal
to the size of the currently enlisted cohort. At wartime the reserves are called. The
reserves comprise all ex-conscripts up to t max years of age. Hence, the country’s
wartime-army is

N (t ) =

tmax

∫ n(τ )dτ

(1)

t

where t ∈ (t min , t max ) denotes the drafting age and n(τ ) the size of the cohort aged τ .
Assuming, for tractability, that all cohorts have an identical size, n, then the wartime
army size is
N (t ) = (t max − t )n .

(2)

Suppose that the opponent is more populous, but possesses the same warfare
technology. For simplicity, its wartime army, N E , is fixed, yet always ready to match
the smaller country’s army: 4

N E = max N (t ) = (t max − t min )n .

(3)

4

A more elaborate, but greatly complicated, framework may consider reaction functions and a
Stackelberg-type equilibrium.
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In the absence of warfare technological advantage, size is crucial: the greater the ratio
of the country’s wartime army to its rival’s wartime army the higher the country’s war
deterrence. In formal terms, the probability of war breaking-out ( 0 < p < 1 ) is given
by

p(t ) = p max [1 − µ ( N (t ) / N E )]

(4)

where the scalar 0 < µ < 1 is the army’s war-deterrent gradient, reflecting
(with µ ≠ 1 ) that the probability of war cannot be eliminated, and where 0 < p max < 1
is a scalar denoting the (highest) probability of war when the country is unarmed.
Recalling equation (2), the probability of war is rendered as
p(t ) = p max [1 − µ (t max − t ) /(t max − t min )]
= p max {1 − µ[(t max − t min ) − (t − t min )] /(t max − t min )}
= (1 − µ ) p max +

.(5)

µp max
(t − t min )
(t max − t min )

The earlier the enlisting age the greater the country’s war-deterrence and the lower the
probability of war. As will become apparent in the following sections, expressing the
probability of war as function of t − t min facilitates the derivation of the optimal
enlistment age within a framework that takes into account a person’s military
contribution,

foregone

civilian

production,

adjustment

costs

and

expected

remunerations to him and his beneficiaries for a loss of quality-adjusted life-years due
to injury, or death, and the effects of these factors on the expected net national benefit
from enlisting that person at age t .
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3. Expected net national benefit and its determinants

The expected net national benefit (ENNB) from enlisting a person at
t ∈ (t min , t max ) years of age is the difference between that person’s military
contribution (M) and the sum of his foregone civilian output ( C ), his costs of
adjusting to military environment and readjusting to civilian environment when
released (S), and his treatment costs and remuneration for loss of quality of life in the
event of being physically and/or psychologically injured in war ( R I ), or the
remuneration to his beneficiaries in the event of his death in war ( R D ). Taking the
probabilities of being injured or killed in war to be θ and φ ( 0 < θ , φ < 1 and
θ + φ < 1 ), respectively, and the probability of war to be given by equation (5), the
expected net national benefit from enlisting a person at t years of age is expressed as
ENNB (t ) = M (t ) − C (t ) − S (t ) − p(t )[θR I (t ) + φR D (t )]

(6)

where M, C, S, R I and R D are measured in present-value nominal units.

Consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis, a person’s military contribution and
civilian output are assumed to be twice differentiable and single-peaked in the interval
(t min , t max ) , depicting an inverted U-shaped relationship between productivity and
age.5 Similarly, the remuneration paid to beneficiaries for a conscript killed in war at
age t is taken to be twice differentiable and single-peaked in the interval (t min , t max )
so as to reflect a growing loss up to a critical age as the number of dependents and

5

Age-earning profiles estimated from cross-sectional data are usually quadratic, hump-shaped for
males (Irvine, 1981). In his seminal study on this issue, Miller (1965) has observed that the relative
increases in income associated with economic growth are greater in the early years of working life than
in the later years. He has argued that young workers tend to benefit more than older ones due to greater
mobility, better training and employers’ preferences.
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human capital rises and then a decline. The following second-order polynomials
display such relationships:
M (t ) = M tmin + α (t − t min ) − α~ (t − t min ) 2

(7)

~
C (t ) = C tmin + β (t − t min ) − β (t − t min ) 2

(8)

R D (t ) = R D tmin + γ (t − t min ) − γ~ (t − t min ) 2

(9)

where, M tmin , C tmin and R D tmin are the military contribution and civilian output of a
t min year old person and the remuneration to beneficiaries for the loss of such a
~
person, respectively, and (α ,α~ ), ( β , β ), (γ , γ~ ) are pairs of positive scalars, expressed
in present-value nominal units, reflecting the intensities of the rise and decline of the
individual’s potential military performance and civilian productivity and of the rise
and decline of the remuneration to beneficiaries for their forgone quality of life in the
event of that person being killed, respectively.

Let t m* ∈ (t min , t max ) and t c* ∈ (t min , t max ) be the prime ages as regards military
contribution and civilian output, respectively, and t d* ∈ (t min , t max ) the age of death
associated with maximum remuneration to beneficiaries, 6 then
M ′(t m* ) = α − 2α~(t m* − t min ) = 0

(10)

~
C ′(t c* ) = β − 2 β (t c* − t min ) = 0

(11)

6

t d* may be determined by a combination of the number of life-years lost and the number and age

composition of dependents.
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R D ' (t d* ) = γ − 2γ~ (t d* − t min ) = 0

(12)

and implying
0.5α
− t min

(13)

~
0.5β
β = *
t c − t min

(14)

α~ =

γ~ =

t m*

t d*

0.5γ
.
− t min

(15)

Consequently, the military contribution of a t year-old person is given by

M (t ) = M tmin + α (t − t min ) −

0.5α
(t − t min ) 2
− t min

t m*

(16)

his foregone civilian output by

C (t ) = C tmin + β (t − t min ) −

0.5 β
(t − t min ) 2
− t min

t c*

(17)

and the remuneration to his beneficiaries in the event of being killed at t is

R D (t ) = R D tmin + γ (t − t min ) −

0.5γ
(t − t min ) 2 .
*
t d − t min

(18)

The larger α , β and γ the greater the intensity of the rise and decline of the
potential military performance, civilian productivity and death remuneration,
respectively, over the period (t min , t max ) . Furthermore, the shorter it takes to reach the
highest level in each of these categories, the steeper the decline.
9

Injury in battle can be physical and/or psychological. Psychological injuries
are inflicted by being violently assaulted, by losing comrades and by killing fellow
human beings. Killing-aversion is manifested in post-traumatic stress disorder, loss of
sense of self-innocence, loss of trust in human beings and institutions and loss of
belief in the benevolence of human kind. (Cf., Grossman and Siddle, 1999) It is
assumed that physical and psychological scars can prevail and adversely affect
earning capacity and social interaction over the rest of the individual lifetime. Thus,
the earlier the injury occurs in one’s life the greater can its cost. This assumption is
formally represented by adding an annuity δ ≥ 0 (in present value), which is paid to
the injured person and his beneficiaries over his potential remaining life expectancy
had there been no injury ( T − t ), to the initial nominal cost R̂ I (in present value) of
treating the injury. The sum of the treatment cost of, and the compensation to, a
person injured at age t is given by
R I (t ) = Rˆ I + δ (T − t ) = [ Rˆ I + δ (T − t min )] − δ (t − t min ) = RtImin − δ (t − t min ) . (19)
144
42444
3
RI
tmin

The scalar δ can be further interpreted as the level of the terminal incapacitation
caused by the injury and measured in terms of foregone pecuniary and non-pecuniary
opportunities per annum. When the initial treatment leads to complete recovery,
δ = 0 . In any other case, δ > 0 .
The costs of adjustment to military environment and readjustment to civilian
environment for a person conscripted at t years of age are represented by
S (t ) = S t min + λ (t − t min )

(20)
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where S tmin is the adjustment and readjustment costs at age t min and λ is the
adjusting-readjusting cost coefficient. There are two opposing factors affecting the
sign of λ : enthusiasm versus experience. While a greater level of eagerness to learn
about organizations and systems and their operation might be associated with youth, a
higher level of familiarity with organizations and systems is enjoyed in mature age.
Hence, λ is positive, zero, or negative, if the foregone enthusiasm is larger than,
equal to, or smaller than, the experience gained as the age of enlistment rises.

By substituting equations (16) to (20) and equation (5) into equation (6), the
expected net national benefit from recruiting a person to military service at age t is
given by:

[

]

ENNB (t ) = M tmin − C tmin − S tmin − (1 − µ ) p max (θRtImin + φRtDmin )
1444444444
424444444444
3
Α0


µp max (θRtImin + φRtDmin ) 
 (t − t min )
+ α − β − λ + (1 − µ ) p max (δθ − γφ ) −
t max − t min


1444444444442444444444443
Α1

 0.5α
0.5γ (1 − µ )φp max µp max (δθ − γφ ) 
0.5 β
2
− *
− *
−
−
 (t − t min )
*
t max − t min 
t −t
 t m − t min t c − t min
144444444444d24min
444444
44443
Α2



− 0.5γµp max
3
+
 (t − t min )
*
 (t max − t min )(t d − t min ) 
1444424444
3
Α3

.(21)

4. Optimal enlistment-age and numerical simulations
The optimal enlistment age is taken to be t o ∈ (t min , t max ) that maximizes ENNB .
Recalling equation (21), the necessary and sufficient conditions for interior solution
are:
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Α 3 (t o − t min ) 2 − Α 2 (t o − t min ) + Α1 = 0

(22)

{2Α 3 (t o − t min ) − Α 2 < 0} ⇒ {t o < t min + 0.5( Α 2 / Α 3 )}

(23)

and the optimal enlistment-age is given by either

t1o = t min +

Α 2 + Α 2 2 − 4 Α 3 Α1

(24)

2Α 3

or

= t min +

t 2o

Α 2 − Α 2 2 − 4Α 3 Α1

(25)

2Α 3

satisfying the second-order condition (23).7 If neither t1o nor t 2o satisfies condition
(23),

the

optimal

enlistment

age

is

the

earliest

feasible

age

if

ENNB (t min ) > ENNB (t max ) , the latest feasible age if ENNB (t min ) < ENNB (t max ) , or
any of these bounds if ENNB (t min ) = ENNB (t max ) .

The numerical simulations of the optimal enlistment-age consider a likely
benchmark scenario where t min = 18

years, t max = 65

years, T = 80 years,

RtDmin = $ 1,000,000 , RtImin = $ 500,000 , Rˆ I = $ 190,000 and in recalling equation
(19), δ = ( RtImin − Rˆ I ) /(T − t min ) = $ 5000 . In the absence of a clear assessment of the
relationship between the costs of adjustment and age, the benchmark value of λ was
set to be equal to zero. Interior solution could only be obtained with

7

Where Α1 , Α 2 , and Α 3 are the coefficient associated with (t − t min ) , (t − t min )
o

(t − t min ) in equation (21), respectively.
o

3
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o

2

and

t 2o = t min + ( Α 2 − Α 2 2 − 4 Α 3 Α1 ) / 2Α 3 and as long as the parameter (α ) governing
the intensity of the rise and decline of the individual’s military performance over the
feasible period is at least 16.666 percent larger than the parameter ( β ) governing the
intensity of the growth and decline of his civilian productivity over the same period. If
α < 1.1666 β , the optimal enlistment age coincides with the lower-bound and
commonly used enlistment age—eighteen.

Table 1 can be inserted here

The benchmark simulation leading to an interior solution is presented in bold
numbers by the central column of Table 1. The effects of the model parameters on the
interior optimal enlistment age can be assessed by inspecting the columns on each
side of the central one. The entries in these columns are computed by changing the
value of one parameter at a time below and above its benchmark level while holding
the rest of the parameters at their benchmark levels. These sensitivity analyses suggest
that the optimal enlistment age first rises and then declines with the level of the
highest probability of war ( p max ), declines with the probability of being killed in war
(φ ) and with the probability of being injured in war (θ ), rises and then declines with
the army’s war-deterrence gradient ( µ ), rises with the prime-age of military
performance, declines with the prime-age of people’s civilian production ( t c* ),
strongly declines with the age of death associated with maximum remuneration to
beneficiaries ( t d* ), rises with the parameter (α ) governing the intensity of the rise and
decline of the individual’s military performance, declines with the parameter ( β )
governing the intensity of the growth and decline of the individual’s civilian
productivity, rises with the parameter (γ ) governing the rise and decline of the death
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remuneration, rises with the annual remuneration extended to injured soldiers ( δ ),
strongly declines with the correlation between costs of adjustment and age ( λ ), rises
with the minimum recruitment age ( t min ) and declines with the maximum recruitment
age ( t max ).

5. Concluding remarks

Early-age enlistment increases the potential army size and thereby the deterrence
capacity of a small country facing geopolitical risks. However, the possibility of
physical and psychological injuries and, ultimately, death and their associated loss of
quality-adjusted life-years erode the expected net benefit from early-age enlistment.
The expected net benefit from early, or late, age recruitment are also affected by
growth and decline of military contribution and civilian output and changes in
adjustment costs over the life cycle. The optimal enlistment-age was analytically
derived by considering the effects of enlistment age on army size and deterrence of
war, military performance, foregone civilian output, remunerations in the case of
physical and psychological injuries or death, and costs of adjustment. The numerical
simulations, performed with an ad hoc assessment of the likely parameters values,
suggest that if the rise and decline of military performance is sufficiently steeper than
the rise and decline of civilian productivity over the lifespan, there exists an interior
optimal enlistment age that is greater than the commonly practiced eighteen. Despite
large parameter changes, most of the simulation results in such a case are at the
vicinity of twenty-one—an age that allows a completion of a first-degree college
program in many disciplines, gaining work experience, participating in voting and
politics and hence having direct influence on terms of service prior to enlistment.
Furthermore, the simulations associated with the possible effect of age on adjustment
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costs suggest that if the experience effect dominates the enthusiasm effect, a much
more mature enlistment age is optimal. The optimality of a much more mature
enlistment age is also suggested when the death-remuneration peaks at young age.
However, the numerical simulations also suggest that if the rise and decline of
military performance is not, or insufficiently, steeper than the rise and decline of
civilian productivity over the lifespan, the optimal enlistment age is the lower-bound
of the feasible recruitment age interval—the commonly practiced eighteen or even
earlier.
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Table 1: Numerical simulations’ results
Parameter
&
Enlisting
age
p max
t o (years)
φ
o

t (years)
θ
t o (years)
µ
t o (years)
t m* (years)
t o (years)
t c* (years)
t o (years)
t d* (years)
to
α
to
β

(years)
(dollars)
(years)
(dollars)

t o (years)
γ (dollars)
t o (years)
δ (dollars)
t o (years)
λ (dollars)
t o (years)
t min
t o (years)
t max
t o (years)

Below the
Much
below the benchmark
benchmark

The
benchmark

Above the Much
benchmark above the
benchmark

0.1
18.209

0.25
19.087

0.50
21.014

0.75
21.906

0.95
20.418

0.01
22.351

0.025
21.860

0.05
21.014

0.075
20.131

0.1
19.206

0.01
21.553
0.1
18.240
25
18.847

0.05
21.319
0.25
19.195
30
19.743

0.10
21.0
0.5
21.0
35
21.0

0.15
20.621
0.75
21.057
40
22.784

0.2
20.350
0.9
19.079
45
25.062

30
32.301

40
21.672

45
21.0

50
20.676

60
20.334

25
45.13

30
27.733

40
21.0

50
19.448

55
19.089

3500
18.248
2000
24.331

3750
19.862
2500
22.908

4000
21.014
3000
21.0

4500
22.610
3250
19.778

5000
23.696
3500
18.222

1000
18.140

2500
18.826

5000
21.0

7500
24.206

9000
26.483

1000
20.404
-5,000
39.347
16
18.776

2500
20.630
-2,500
31.544
17
19.894

5000
21.0
0
21.0
18
21.014

7500
21.405
250
19.651
19
22.135

9000
21.643
500
18.187
20
23.257

55
21.583

60
21.335

65
21.014

67.5
20.852

70
20.696
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